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This study has two purposes: (1) To construct a partial theory of succession, and (2) to utilize a method of theory construction which combines some of the concepts of Hans Zetterberg with the principles of formal symbolic logic. A bibliography on succession in complex organizations with entries on descriptive and empirical studies from various disciplines was compiled, and from these works propositions were abstracted and categorized by key words into 91 sets and subsets. A matrix was constructed for each set and subset, and from each matrix hypothetical syllogisms were formed which employed other connectives to use as many of the units as possible. The three major sets of Predecessor, Inside Successor, and Outside Successor along with their subsets were selected for this work. Two general propositions are inferred from the study: (1) The degree and level of the predecessor's participation in successor selection varies with his success as a leader and the length of his tenure, and (2) the successor's deviation from the status quo will vary with the number and intensity of the constraints placed upon him. An 86-item, partially annotated bibliography is included. (HW)

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A PARTIAL THEORY OF EXECUTIVE SUCCESSION

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Francis C. Thiemann

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

While some of the problems facing modern complex organizations are peculiar to them and have traceable histories, the beginnings of others are lost in antiquity along with the organizations which gave them life. Each of these problems, the perennial and the unique, varies with its impact upon the organization; each is accompanied by its own pragmatic drama of awareness, identification, and alternate solutions. Some of the solutions work and are routinized; others have to be reworked with each encounter. But of all the problems besetting the organization, few are older, few are more traumatic, few are as enigmatic as that of succession. Every organization which has attempted to persist beyond its founder is confronted with the questions: Who now will lead? Who will follow? What direction will the organization take? Will it prosper or cease to exist? Such questions have divided tribes and religions and have caused rifts and schisms which have brought about the loss and destruction of all that had been won.

Life, precarious as it is under the finest leader, is fraught with anxieties and fears when the poorest leader falls. But the dim despair of one day becomes the blazing hope of another. It is no wonder, then, that the tragic paronomasia--"The King is dead, long live the King!"--could elicit both fear and hope in the coriaceous hearts of the men-at-arms.

The drama of succession is not a single point in time. It is predictable and anticipated because of man's mortality. It occurs and has myriad consequences, both expected and unexpected. While, in a gross way, much is known of the process, no predecessor knows when or under what conditions the office will be passed on. Nor can he be certain who will succeed him, the results of the succession, or its final end. Succession, then, as a perennial phenomenon of man's organization, needs to be studied and theories need to be developed so that the dysfunctional consequence can be minimized by understanding the relationship between the variables and increasing predictability.

Purpose, Objective, and Assumption

It was the primary purpose of this study to construct a partial theory of executive succession by abstracting from the literature assertions men have made about their experiences with the phenomenon of succession in complex organizations. These assertions, having various degrees of verifiability ranging from purely empirical to speculative, were then ordered by a mind-established system of logic. From this ordering of assertions a partial theory of succession was constructed that could be tested empirically against experiences. The theory was not seen to be proven but, in the manner of Popper,[1] was viewed as a temporary step always to be improved.

A second purpose of this study was to apply the methodology of formal symbolic logic to the construction of theory. For if it is true that new theories need to be found to answer questions not answered by older theories,[2] then how much more so should it be true of model-forming methods? The inadequacy of the models may be attributed in some cases to the methods used in creating them. Since no one method of model-making can cope with the variety of theories that are needed, this study is but one more attempt to determine the utility and limitations of this method.

Underlying the purpose of this study was the assumption advanced by Kant[3] that a difference exists between the noumenal and the phenomenal world. In gross terms, he held that the noumenal world is the world as it actually exists in and of itself. It is opposed to the world of appearance, the phenomenal world, in that it cannot be known. It is theoretically problematic and is postulated by practical reason. The phenomenal world is the world perceived by men. It is the only world man can know, since the real world is beyond his knowledge. Study and knowledge are based upon what appears to the physical senses and is ordered by the mental capacities. The philosophical problem of whether there is or is not a reality behind the phenomenon, interesting as it is, is not important to the purpose of this study, but what is important is that:

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[1] K. R. Popper. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Basic Books, Inc. 1959. pp. 27-92.

[2] Thomas S. Kuhn. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. 1965. p. 18.

[3] Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. (Trans. N. K. Smith) New York: MacMillan & Co., 1929. p. 88.

> Kant effects a synthesis of rationalism and empiricism. Rationalism holds that reason supplies both the form and matter of knowledge. Empiricism maintains that the whole of knowledge is derived from experience. Kant grants that experience supplies the matter of knowledge, but insists that the form is due to the structure of the mind.[4]

Thus, the mind orders the experiences in a certain manner, and then, in an Aristotilian sense, after making the abstraction from practice, a principle is established from which practice proceeds.

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[4] Ch. Perelman. An Historical Introduction to Philosophical Thinking. New York: Random House. 1965. p. 178.

Necessity for Theoretical Formulization

Over the past twenty years a number of articles and studies have appeared in publications of various disciplines concerning succession in complex organizations. Many of the early investigations, descriptive in nature, examined the problem of succession in restaurants,[5] the military,[6] and railroads.[7] As units were identified, other studies were conducted to determine their universality or to bring them into finer focus. The Presidency of the United States,[8] the public schools,[9] public health,[10] and baseball teams[11] soon came under scrutiny. Contributions came from anthropology, business, education, history, political science, sociology, and psychology. Organizations in every area of the globe came into the researcher's arena.

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[5] W. P. Whyte. Human Relations in the Restaurant Industry. New York: McGraw-Hill. 1948. Chapter 22.

[6] M. B. Smith. The American Soldier. Vol. II, ed. S. Stouffer et. al. New York: Princeton Univ. Press. 1949.

[7] Marshall E. Dimock and Howard K. Hyde. Reader in Bureaucracy. ed. R. Merton et. al. Blencoe, Ill.: The Free Press. 1952.

[8] L. L. Henry. "Transferring the Presidency: Variations, Trends, and Patterns." Public Administration Review, 20:187-194, Autumn, 1960.

[9] Richard O. Carlson. Executive Succession and Organizational Change. Chicago: Midwest Administration Center, University of Chicago. 1962.

[10] Louis Kriesberg. "Careers, Organization Size and Succession." American Journal of Sociology, 68: 355-359, November, 1962.

[11] Oscar Grusky. "Managerial Succession and Organizational Effectiveness." American Journal of Sociology, 69:21-31. July, 1963.

In spite of all the efforts that were expended on the elusive issue, Gouldner's appraisal of the state of knowledge is as applicable at the time of this writing as it was in 1950 when he said, "In actuality, empirical studies of the process of succession and its concomitant problems are practically nonexistent."[12] Grusky supported this statement ten years later when he noted: "The fact that there have been few empirical studies of succession immediately labels most of our comments frankly speculative."[13] With the state of knowledge as it was, Grusky was not sure at that time, that any attempt to construct a theory was either "essential or desirable."[14] Two years later Carlson emphasized the need for propositions of succession to become part of the theory of organizations. Due to the fact that

> The frequency with which organizations must adapt to succession, its developmental sig-

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[12] Alvin Gouldner. "The Problem of Succession and Bureaucracy." Studies in Leadership. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950, p. 2.

[13] Grusky, op. cit., p. 105.

[14] Grusky, ibid., p. 107.

> nificance, and its potential disruptive character mark it as a process worthy of close examination. There should be no doubt that organizational theory must contain propositions about succession, organizational response to succession, and organizational consequences of succession.[15]

Investigations continued to focus on a select few of the attributes with such force that the casual reader of the literature assumed succession was an area with little elbow room. Because of this, Jackson's comments on the need for a theory of leadership are equally applicable to the need for a theory of succession.

> The phenomenon of leadership must ultimately be ordered to a theoretical system which conceptualizes all of the relevant attributes and which states their logical relationships. At the present time such a coherent articulate theory does not exist. Without an adequate theory, it is difficult to formulate research problems concerning the total process of leadership.[16]

Since no attempt had been made to order the literature of succession into a theoretical system, logically related, and empirically based, one obvious need was to formulate a partial theory as a first step in achieving this goal. It is from such a partial theory that researchers may gain fresh, theoretically based insights that open on to new and fruitful fields of empirical research.

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[15] Richard O. Carlson. Executive Succession and Organizational Change. Chicago: Midwest Administration Center, University of Chicago. 1962. p. 3.

[16] Jay M. Jackson. "The Effect of Changing the Leadership of Small Work Groups." Human Relations, 6: 25-49 February, 1953. p. 25.

A second obvious need was to determine if the concepts of symbolic logic could be fruitfully employed in theory construction. That is, could formal logic provide the means of establishing the relationships among the data?

With these needs in mind this study was conducted.

Methodological Procedure

The methodological format of this study combines some of the concepts of Zetterberg[17] with those of formal logic as developed by Whitehead and Russell[18] and advanced and expounded by a number of others. A step by step development of the format is as follows:

Initially, a bibliography was developed and published.[19] It was from the individual works of this bibliography that propositions were abstracted and placed into standard form. Where the writers of the works had already phrased the propositions in standard form, they were used as such. In other cases, the assertion was rephrased with the attempt to retain the original meaning while standardizing the form. In standard form each proposition is composed of two units[20] joined together by a law-like connective. The hypothetical "If, then" combination is used as the connective. More precisely, the hypothetical connective is used where the first unit "p" is connected with the second unit "q" as: "If p, then q."

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[17] Hans L. Zetterberg. On Theory and Verification in Sociology. New Jersey: The Bedminster Press. 1965.

[18] Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell. Principia Mathematica. (1910), 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950. Vol. I.

[19] Francis C. Thiemann. "Selected Bibliography of Succession in Complex Organizations." ERIC, University of Oregon. 1967.

Since "p" and "q" are substitution variables, they are symbolic representations of statement variables (upper case letters represent statements) but are not themselves statements. Each unit, then, could contain a simple sentence structure rather than a more involved one. In total, 486 such propositions were abstracted from 57 individual works of the literature.

After the propositions had been collected, the works were perused again and propositions were abstracted for the second time. A comparison by work was then made of the two independently collected sets of propositions. If a variance appeared between the two sets, the original study was reexamined and an adjustment made in light of the discrepancy and the last analysis. The separate units of each of the propositions were then placed on IBM data cards along with a two-digit numerical identification for the bibliographical reference and a two-digit identification number for the initial set classification.

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[20] The term "unit" is used here to indicate that part of an assertion or proposition which is on either side of a connective. Or they are the "things" that the connective joins together in some relative way; i.e. "p" is such a unit as it is connected with "q" in "$p \supset q$."

Sets[21] were established from a collection of the key words appearing in the literature. If a proposition contained more than one key word, it was placed in the same number of sets as key words appearing in it. Thus, a number of IBM cards were used having the same bibliographical reference and propositional unit but with different set identification. Such set development corresponds to Zetterberg's concept of Propositional Inventory.[22] Where Zetterberg employed his model in axiomatically developing and deriving propositions that had a high level of verifiability and did not need to be tested, the utilization here of the inventory concept was to define the known perimeters for the theory. Therefore, the verifiability of the assertions was not stressed. Stoll noted that in all the sciences except mathematics and logic the final appeal to the truth of statements was to be found in experimentation.[23] It was assumed, therefore, that all propositions must be tested empirically.

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[21] A set is defined as any collection of definite, distinguishable units ordered by the intellect and treated as a whole.

[22] Zetterberg, op. cit., pp. 88-90.

Once the propositions were categorized into the 91 various sets and all duplicate propositions were eliminated,[24] a 360 computer program was written to place each unit of each proposition within the set in relation to every other unit within the set. This print-out provided the hypothetical relationship of one-half of the matrix for each set. The other half of the matrix was obtained by reading the units in reverse. Since the position of the first unit of a hypothetical proposition is termed the determinant or the antecedent and the second unit is termed the resultant or the consequence, the reversibility of the printed propositions was obtained by using the determinant as the resultant and the resultant as the determinant. That is, to determine the reversible of "If p, then q." one would read, "If q, then p." Now, while the establishment of the matrix precedes the construction of the "chain,"[25] which will be referred to interchangeably in this work as the "hypothetical syllogism," it is necessary to understand the logical basis for the hypothetical syllogism before returning to the matrix and its relevance.

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[23] Robert R. Stoll, Sets, Logic and Axiomatic Theories, San Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1961, p. 125.

[24] The eliminated duplicate propositions and their sources have not been noted in this work. Those selected and reported were from the three sets and their subsets used in this study.

[25] Zetterberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-92.

Where the statements thus formed are called hypothetical propositions, a hypothetical syllogism may be formed by selecting two or more hypothetical propositions which can be chained together in such a way that the resultant of the first premise (the first assertion in the argument) becomes the determinant of the second premise. If more than two premises are used in the argument, then the resultant of the second premise becomes the determinant of the third premise and so forth. Given any number of premises so connected, a conclusion may be formally constructed by combining the determinant of the first premise with the resultant of the last premise used in the argument. That is, using substitution variables in the argument form where the "horseshoe" ($\supset$) symbolically represents the "If, then." connective, we have:

Illustration I

Argument Form Using The "If, then." Connective

$p \supset q$	first premise
$q \supset r$	second premise
$r \supset s$	third premise
$\therefore p \supset s$	conclusion

The "q" and the "r" are the linkages that join the determinant "p" in the first premise with the resultant "s" in the third premise. Two premises are a sufficient condition for the hypothetical syllogism form, while the argument's form is a necessary condition for its validity.

To have a valid argument form, it is necessary that in no case the premises be true and the conclusion false. Since truth and falsity are related to statements, a premise may be said to be true or false, but an argument is only described as valid or invalid. The truth value of a statement is determined by means of a truth table. In the above case using only the first and second premises with a conclusion of "$\therefore p \supset r$," the truth table would appear as:

Illustration II

A Three-Guide Column Truth Table

			1st	2nd	Conclusion
p	q	r	$p \supset q$	$q \supset r$	$p \supset r$
T	T	T	T	T	T
T	T	F	T	F	F
T	F	T	F	T	T
T	F	F	F	T	F
F	T	T	T	T	T
F	T	F	T	F	T
F	F	T	T	T	T
F	F	F	T	T	T

Where "p," "q," and "r" appear in the first three columns which are noted as guide columns, "$p \supset q$," "$q \supset r$," and "$p \supset r$" in the last three columns represent the two premises and the conclusion of the argument. The truth values in each of the guide columns are formally established in the manner shown. If a fourth substitution variable were used, it would label the first eight rows as true and the last eight rows as false. This would mean that columns "p," "q," and "r" would need to be extended eight more rows. In this case eight rows are sufficient with the column of "r" alternating the "T's" and "F's," the column of "q" having two "T's" and two "F's" in alternation and the column of "p" with four "T's" and four "F's." To determine the truth value of $p \supset q$, one must follow the rule that if the determinant is true and the resultant is false, the statement $p \supset q$ must be false. All other relationships are considered as true. The following illustration shows the truth table value for $p \supset q$:

Illustration III

Truth Table for $p \supset q$

p	q	$p \supset q$
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	T
F	F	T

The only F's appearing in Illustration II under the first premise are in rows 3 and 4 where in guide columns "p" and "q," "p" has T's in those rows and "q" has F's. Similar reasoning is applied in the column for the second premise and for the conclusion. Now in no case does there appear in the rows for the first and second premise column T's that are followed by an F in the conclusion column, thus establishing the validity of the hypothetical syllogism.

The construction of the hypothetical syllogism is a relatively simple matter when only a few units are involved but becomes a major task when a great number of units are placed within a set. The matrix facilitates establishment of possible chains. The example below of a 4 X 4 matrix will best illustrate both the function and the relevance of this method:

Illustration IV

4 X 4 Matrix

	p	q	r	s
p	X	p⊃q	p⊃r	p⊃s
q	q⊃p	X	q⊃r	q⊃s
r	r⊃p	r⊃q	X	r⊃s
s	s⊃p	s⊃q	s⊃r	X

The matrix contains two sides--a right and a left of the diagonal X. The formula $n^2 - n$ = the total number of possible cells in a matrix. The printed computer program gave the right side while the left was determined, as stated before, by reading the units in reverse. If, in Illustration IV, all of the units in combination were judged to be reversible, then the matrix would have no empty cells.

If in one's judgment some relations were not reversible, a slash (/) would be placed in that cell while the corresponding cell would be filled by the units involved. If no relationship existed either to the right or to the left, an (X) would be placed in the appropriate cells. At a glance, then, or by a frequency count of rows and columns, one could determine how each unit "fit" the other units. One of the values of such a matrix is to determine the possible combinations of propositions and the length of the chains which could be constructed. Inherent in each matrix, if all cells are filled, is the deductive capacity of obtaining every proposition as the conclusion of a hypothetical syllogism. It is to be understood that in deduction nothing may be contained in the conclusion that is not contained in the premises. Therefore, the following 24 hypothetical syllogisms may be obtained from the matrix in Illustration IV:

Illustration V

Syllogisms Obtainable from a 4 X 4 Matrix

$$\begin{array}{r} p \supset q \\ q \supset r \\ {}^{*}r \supset s \\ \hline \therefore +p \supset s \end{array} \qquad \begin{array}{r} p \supset q \\ q \supset s \\ s \supset r \\ \hline \therefore p \supset r \end{array} \qquad \begin{array}{r} p \supset r \\ r \supset q \\ {}^{*}q \supset s \\ \hline \therefore +p \supset s \end{array} \qquad \begin{array}{r} p \supset r \\ r \supset s \\ s \supset q \\ \hline \therefore p \supset q \end{array} \qquad \begin{array}{r} +p \supset s \\ s \supset r \\ {}^{*}r \supset q \\ \hline \therefore p \supset q \end{array} \qquad \begin{array}{r} +p \supset s \\ s \supset q \\ {}^{*}q \supset r \\ \hline \therefore p \supset r \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{r} q \supset p \\ p \supset r \\ r \supset s \\ \hline \therefore q \supset s \end{array} \qquad \begin{array}{r} q \supset p \\ +p \supset s \\ {}^{*}s \supset r \\ \hline \therefore q \supset r \end{array} \qquad \begin{array}{r} q \supset r \\ {}^{*}r \supset p \\ +p \supset s \\ \hline \therefore q \supset s \end{array} \qquad \begin{array}{r} q \supset r \\ r \supset s \\ {}^{*}s \supset p \\ \hline \therefore q \supset p \end{array} \qquad \begin{array}{r} q \supset s \\ s \supset p \\ {}^{*}p \supset r \\ \hline \therefore q \supset r \end{array} \qquad \begin{array}{r} q \supset s \\ s \supset r \\ r \supset p \\ \hline \therefore q \supset r \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{cccccc}
r\supset p & r\supset p & r\supset q & r\supset q & r\supset s & r\supset s \\
p\supset q & {}^{+}p\supset s & q\supset s & {}_{*}q\supset p & s\supset p & s\supset q \\
q\supset s & {}^{*}s\supset q & {}^{*}s\supset p & {}^{+}p\supset s & {}^{*}p\supset q & q\supset p \\
\hline
\therefore r\supset s & \therefore r\supset q & \therefore r\supset p & \therefore r\supset s & \therefore r\supset q & \therefore r\supset p
\end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{cccccc}
s\supset p & s\supset p & s\supset q & s\supset q & s\supset r & s\supset r \\
p\supset q & p\supset r & q\supset r & p\supset q & r\supset p & r\supset q \\
{}^{*}q\supset r & {}^{*}r\supset q & {}^{*}r\supset p & p\supset r & p\supset q & {}^{*}q\supset p \\
\hline
\therefore s\supset r & \therefore s\supset q & \therefore s\supset p & \therefore s\supset r & \therefore s\supset q & \therefore s\supset p
\end{array}$$

It is further noted that by adding another premise to each of the above a tautology may be formed. For example, in the first syllogism a fourth premise may be added:

$$\begin{array}{c}
p\supset q \\
q\supset r \\
r\supset s \\
s\supset p \\
\hline
\therefore p\supset p
\end{array}$$

Now, if any of the cells are empty or if an assertion is not reversible, then the possible chains are lessened. If in Illustration IV the two cells $p\supset s$ and $s\supset p$ were empty and no relationship existed between the two, then 16 of the hypothetical syllogisms in Illustration V would be eliminated. This has been noted by the asterisk (*) in front of the eliminated chains. If, on the other hand, the statement $s\supset p$ were not reversible, then a slash (/) would appear in the cell $p\supset s$. In such an occurrence eight hypothetical syllogisms would be eliminated. These have been marked with a plus (+) in Illustration V.

To this point the concepts of Zetterberg have been discussed, but since he utilizes only one of the four connectives of formal logic and makes no reference to negation, these need to be covered before the extended argument can be understood.

It is when the researcher is confronted with a series of statements that cannot be joined by the hypothetical that the other connectives are found useful. For example, if two writers in the literature state diametrically opposing views of the same phenomena, it is impossible to connect them in a hypothetical syllogism, yet it is possible and even advantageous to state them as: "p or not p." Before this problem is developed further, these other connectives must be discussed more fully.

The "or" symbolized by a (v) and known as a "vel" or disjunction is a logical connective that joins two units whose truth value can be determined by the truth table noted below:

Illustration VI

Truth Table for p v q

p	q	p v q
T	T	T
T	F	T
F	T	T
F	F	F

When the disjunctive proposition is used, the units are called disjuncts and the interpretation is to be in the inclusive sense of "or." With the disjunction it is true, then, in every case except where the disjuncts are both false.

Conjunction is represented by the dot (.) and the conjuncts when combined as p . q are read as p and q. The truth table for the conjunction illustrates that it is true only when the conjuncts are true.

Illustration VII

Truth Table for p . q

p	q	p . q
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	F
F	F	F

Material equivalence (≡) is read as "if and only if" or "is materially equivalent to," the latter the most commonly used in this study. Symbolically, the two units and the connective appear as p ≡ q, and this is read as "p is materially equivalent to q." Again, its truth value is shown in the following table:

Illustration VIII

Truth Table for p ≡ q

p	q	p ≡ q
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	F
F	F	T

Here it is noted that material equivalence (≡) is true only if both units are true or if both are false.

The negation, symbolized by a tilde (~), of either a single unit or of a compound statement is the opposite value of that unit or statement. When p is given as true, then $\sim p$ is said to be false and $p \equiv \sim\sim p$ is seen as a tautology.

By logical manipulation it is possible to reduce all connectives and the negation to the hypothetical and negation. While this is true in symbolic logic where mathematical and logical symbols devoid of emotional overtones are used throughout, the present study is facilitated by using the other connectives since the statements are more difficult to handle because they are couched in ordinary language.

As units can be related by the four connectives and negation, their length can increase to the point that a truth table is no longer practical. For example, a truth table having two units in the guide column would have four rows of T's and F's. When a third unit is added, it becomes eight rows; four units have sixteen rows; and, if eleven units were used a truth table of 2,048 rows would be needed. It is obvious that when the extended argument is used, another method is needed to determine validity. The method employed in formal logic utilizes inferences from simple arguments and logical equivalences. The validity of each of these forms can be determined by a truth table and are therefore known to be valid. They are listed below without comment:

Illustration IX

Inferences by Simple Argument

Modus Ponens

$p \supset q$
$p / \therefore q$

Modus Tolens

$p \supset q$
$\sim q / \therefore \sim p$

Hypothetical Syllogism

$p \supset q$
$q \supset r / \therefore p \supset r$

Disjunctive Syllogism

$p \vee q$
$\sim p / \therefore q$

Constructive Dilemma

$(p \supset q) \cdot (r \supset s)$
$p \vee r / \therefore q \vee s$

Absorption

$p \supset q / \therefore p \supset (p \cdot q)$

Simplification

$p \cdot q / \therefore p$

Conjunction

p
$q / \therefore p \cdot q$

Addition

$p / \therefore p \vee q$

Logical Equivalents

De Morgan's Theorems

$\sim(p \cdot q) \equiv (\sim p \vee \sim q)$
$\sim(p \vee q) \equiv (\sim p \cdot \sim q)$

Commutation

$(p \vee q) \equiv (q \vee p)$
$(p \cdot q) \equiv (q \cdot p)$

Association

$[p \vee (q \vee r)] \equiv [(p \vee q) \vee r]$
$[p \cdot (q \cdot r)] \equiv [(p \cdot q) \cdot r]$

Distribution

$[p \cdot (q \vee r)] \equiv [(p \cdot q) \vee (p \cdot r)]$
$[p \vee (q \cdot r)] \equiv [(p \vee q) \cdot (p \vee r)]$

Double Negation

$p \equiv \sim\sim p$

Material Implication

$(p \supset q) \equiv (\sim p \vee q)$

Material Equivalence

$(p \equiv q) \equiv [(p \supset q) \cdot (q \supset p)]$
$(p \equiv q) \equiv [(p \cdot q) \vee (\sim p \cdot \sim q)]$

Exportation

$[(p \cdot q) \supset r] \equiv [p \supset (q \supset r)]$

Transposition

$(p \supset q) \equiv (\sim q \supset \sim p)$

Tautology

$p \equiv (p \vee p)$
$p \equiv (p \cdot p)$
$p \equiv (p \supset p)$
$p \equiv (p \equiv p)$

By using these connectives, inferences, and logical equivalences, combinations are possible within and between sets. These combinations may represent a series of connectives within the hypothetical syllogism, for example:

$(A \vee B) \supset (c \cdot D)$
$(C \cdot D) \supset [(E \vee F) \supset G]$
$[(E \vee F) \supset G] \supset (H \vee I) \ / \therefore G \supset (H \vee I)$

The statement variables used above may be substituted with substitution variables where each substitution variable may represent one or more statement variables as:

$p \supset q$
$q \supset (r \supset s)$
$(r \supset s) \supset t \ / \therefore s \supset t$

The premises of this argument are seen to be in the form of the hypothetical syllogism, and if the conclusion had been $p \supset t$, then it would have been a valid argument form. The conclusion, however, does not follow the chain form but the validity of the argument can still be determined by using a modus ponens in the second premise to remove the $r \supset s$ from the premise statement; next, to remove the "s" from that statement another modus ponens would be used which allows the conclusion to become:

$$s \supset t \quad \text{or} \quad G \supset (H \vee I)$$

The advantage of using the extended argument is recognized when it is reconsidered that matrices generally do contain empty cells. As was stated above, when cells are empty, the length of the chains is shortened, and in the larger matrices some valuable propositional data would not be used. By using the extended argument, some strength is lost but all the data may be used.

Validating the extended argument may be accomplished by two methods: (1) by using the immediate inferences as noted on pages 21 and 22, and (2) by using the modified truth table technique. To facilitate the latter, a second program was written for the 360 computer. This program was used to check the validity of the arguments already determined valid by using immediate inferences.

The methodological approach of this study, then, was dependent upon the principles of formal logic inherent in the methods of Zetterberg and brought to fruition by the extended argument form.

The chain arguments developed from the matrices of the three sets are reported in Chapter II. Since these arguments are in ordinary language, no interpretation has been given; and since all the arguments take the form of the hypothetical syllogism, they are assumed to be intuitively valid, and symbolic representation is not provided.

In Chapter III the within-set arguments for the Predecessor, the Inside Successor, and the Outside Successor are combined into the extended argument and reported both with interpretations and symbolic formulas. These arguments form the partial theory on which the general propositions reported in Chapter III, Summary and Conclusions, are based. The study concludes with "Bibliography, Succession in Complex Organizations," annotated with the propositions reported in this study, and a supplemental bibliography of general references used in the work.

Procedural Constraints

Several limitations are noted which lessened the effectiveness of this study. Some of these were imposed by the writer; others were inherent in the semantic and logical character of the work. Those which were considered of primary importance are discussed below.

First, from the 87 works listed in the bibliography a selection was made of those which appeared to contain propositions most relevant to the study. In general, the 30 not used were descriptive studies, supportive in nature, or contained propositions which could only most tenuously be inferred. The loss of data is noted as a serious limitation.

Second, since the writers of the literature have no uniform format for presenting their hypotheses and propositions, the researcher in abstracting the material and placing it in standard form may have lost some of the intended strength or, perhaps, gained more than the writers could have justified from their data. The difficulties of interpretation and judgment are inherent throughout the study.

Third, whereas the researcher began with 486 abstracted propositions in 91 sets and subsets, the study utilized only 131 propositions and 25 sets and subsets. The selection of the three major sets of Predecessor, Inside Successor and Outside Successor was based on the assumption that these were the main actors in the drama of succession.

Fourth, because of the novelty of using formal logic in the construction of theory in the social sciences, and especially the methodology employed in this study, little previous work could be consulted. Those which were examined dealt primarily with axiomatic theory which was not wholly pertinent to this effort. This obvious limitation affected the sophistication of the design and the execution of the work. Along with this the researcher was limited by his astuteness in making logical inferences and in manipulating the units according to the logical scheme. It has been noted in logic and mathematics that because a problem cannot be solved does not mean that it is invalid, but it does imply the limitations under which logicians and mathematicians must work.

Throughout the four limitations stated above, a single, fundamental one, value judgment, is implicitly manifested. Since no rationale was or could be given for each value judgment made, the subjective nature of the study is acknowledged as a limitation.[26]

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[26] This limitation and the basic assumption of the study (pages 3-4) are complementary since both are related to experiences that are mind-ordered.

CHAPTER II

A REPORT OF THE HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISMS ABSTRACTED FROM THE MATRICES

It is the purpose of this chapter to report the syllogistic arguments developed from the matrices in the three major sets of Predecessor, Inside Successor,[1] and Outside Successor.[2] Twenty-six arguments are reported--eleven from the set of Predecessor, seven from the set of Inside Successor, and eight from the set of Outside Successor. Since each argument is presented in ordinary language, no elaborations or inferences are made. While connectives, other than the hypothetical, are used throughout, the chain validity of each argument is intuitively apparent and is not, therefore, reported in symbolic form. Forty-five individual works listed in the bibliography were the sources for the units used in the arguments and are identified by the reference number preceding each argument.

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[1] An Inside Successor is one who places more importance on the place he lives and works than he does on his career. He generally spends his professional career in one organization and advances by coming up through the ranks.

[2] An Outside Successor is a stranger to the organization and is more concerned with his career and the organization's development than he is with the place in which he lives.

Arguments from the Predecessor Set

SET Ia References 03 and 48.

If the charismatic leader is a dictator who fails to pass on the power to his successor while he still has the capacity to do so, then he cannot guarantee that his choice of a successor will be accepted and he may have to fill the position with a successor who owes loyalty to another.

If the predecessor cannot guarantee who will succeed him, then the regime may, under the successor, retain its present form, seek a more effective one, or attempt a revolutionary solution.

THEREFORE, if the charismatic leader fails to pass on his power to a successor of his choice while he has the power to do so, then the regime may follow any one of three or more different patterns after he steps down.

SET Ib References 03, 33, and 48.

If the predecessor is charismatic or if he feels protective of the organizational structure and doubts that any major change is possible, then communication between the predecessor and the successor is not opened and the predecessor will see the successor as being uninformed.

If communication is not opened and he sees his successor as being uninformed, then he will fail to train the successor for the position.

THEREFORE, if the predecessor is charismatic or if he feels protective of the organizational structure, then he will fail to train the successor for the position.

SET Ic References 05 and 67.

If the predecessor has had a long term in office and if he is dictatorially inclined, then he may concentrate substantial power in only one anticipatory successor (rival) or he may establish a triad of himself, his choice of a successor, and the anticipatory successor (rival).

If the predecessor gives such power or establishes such a triad, then he sets the stage for the successor's assumption of power but he does not consummate it and he will choose a successor and a rival who will not threaten his present power or his future glory.

THEREFORE, if the predecessor has had a long term in office and if he is dictatorially inclined, then he sets the stage for the assumption of power but he does not consummate it and he will choose both a successor and a rival who will not threaten him now or in the future.

SET Id Reference 67.

It follows from SET Ic that if the predecessor, to protect his appointed successor, establishes a triad, then he will be concentrating substantial power in the hands of the rival. By establishing such a triad and the granting of such power he may find it difficult to prevent the rival from seizing the remainder of power.

SET Ie Reference 11 and 58.

If the predecessor has the power to select his successor or if he feels his recommendations may be accepted, then he may consult with other officials on the succession problem.

If he does consult with others, then he may select his successor years in advance and train him for the job, but even if he does this, he will be unable to bequeath to him his authority, his political skill, or his good luck.

THEREFORE, even though the predecessor has the power to select his successor in advance and train him, he cannot provide him with the intangibles which he alone possesses.

SET If References 03, 05, 19, and 58.

If the predecessor is a statesman, then he has outside recognition of his successful performance.

If he has had outside recognition of his successful performance, then his recommendation for a successor is sought and approved and he will be able to determine the form of his succession.

THEREFORE, if the predecessor is a statesman, then he will be able to determine the form of his succession.

SET Ik References 19 and 83.

If the predecessor dies in office or if his death is not anticipated, then the predecessor's death stops the transfer of accumulated organizational knowledge, destroys his organizational influence, and introduces discontinuity into the system.

If death stops the transfer of knowledge and influence, and introduces discontinuity into the system, then his death may lead to factionalism among the contenders.

THEREFORE, if he dies in office or if his death is not anticipated, then factionalism may develop among the contenders.

SET Ig References 05, 82, and 84.

If the predecessor is to influence the decisions of the board on the choice of a successor, then his organization must be perceived as satisfactory by the board and he must have been receiving good cooperation from the staff.

If he was performing satisfactorily and was getting good cooperation from the staff, then his influence of the board of control in its choice of a successor will be done largely through indirect and informal means.

THEREFORE, if the predecessor is to influence the decisions of the board or its choice of a successor, then he will do it through indirect and informal means.

SET Ih References 05, 28, 33, and 84.

If the predecessor's term was short or if he did not have the solution to a crisis problem, then he will lack the relevant information and the mechanism of successor election and he is without power to shape the choice of his own successor.

If he lacks the information and mechanism and is without the power to shape the choice of his own successor, then the successor is more likely to be an outsider who will not be constrained by the predecessor's heritage of relationships.

THEREFORE, if the predecessor's term is short or if he does not have the solution to crisis problems, then the successor will probably be an outsider who will not be constrained by the predecessor's heritage of relationships.

SET Ii References 19, 58, and 82.

If the predecessor is generally unpopular or is popular with a clique and is not asked by the board to assist in the selection of a successor, then he will have little influence on the successor's orientation toward change.

THEREFORE, if the predecessor is generally unpopular or is popular with a clique, then he will have little influence on the successor's orientation toward change.

SET Ij References 19, 58, and 65.

If the predecessor is seen as a favorite by the old board of control, then he will be dismissed or not rehired by the new board.

If the predecessor will be dismissed or not be rehired by the new board, then he will have little influence on his successor's orientation toward change.

THEREFORE, if the predecessor is seen as a favorite by the new board, then he will have little influence on his successor's orientation toward change.

Arguments from the Inside Successor Set

SET IIa References 04, 05, 06, 19, and 81.

If the predecessor is an insider and he is succeeded by an insider and the predecessor is removed from office before the retirement age has been reached, then the predecessor is generally in a position to refuse to retire and he often will take an existing or a newly created position in the same organization.

If the predecessor is generally in a position to refuse to retire and if he often will take an existing or a newly created position in the same organization, then either the predecessor's presence acts to stabilize the successor's orientation to change or the organization's reaction to the successor will depend upon the relations to the predecessor.

THEREFORE, if the predecessor is an insider and he is succeeded by an inside successor and the predecessor is removed from office before his retirement age has been reached, then either the predecessor's presence acts to stabilize the successor's orientation to change or the organization's reaction to the successor will depend upon the relations established by the predecessor.

SET IIb References 05, 10, and 28.

If the inside successor has held a position in only one organization, then the insider is older in his first position than an outsider and the insider more than likely was second in command before the succession.

If the insider is older upon assuming his first position than a comparable outsider and if he is more than likely second in command before the succession, then he has spent the majority of his career in one field coming up through the ranks and has proven his mettle in a number of difficult assignments in some area of the organization and has been given short, diversified experience beyond his own specialty.

If the inside successor has spent the majority of his career in one field coming up through the ranks, has proven his mettle in a number of difficult assignments in some area of the organization, and has been given short, diversified experiences beyond his own specialty in the organization, then the insider was picked for fast career movements when he entered the organization and the successor will tend to be second in influence within the organization.

THEREFORE, if the insider has held a position in only one organization, then he was picked for fast career movement when he entered the organization and the successor will tend to be second in influence in the organization.

SET IIc References 05, 39, 40, and 60.

If the inside successor gives attention to old rules to reaffirm the status quo and if either he forms ties with the board of control before assuming office or is more controlled by the board and staff than is the outsider, then the inside successor's established relations within the organization make him less vulnerable than the outside successor would be.

If the inside successor's established relations within the organization make him less vulnerable than an outside successor, then the insider will maintain the status quo.

THEREFORE, if the inside successor forms ties with the board of control before assuming office or is more controlled by the board and staff than the outside successor would be, then the insider will maintain the status quo.

SET IId References 05 and 39.

If the inside successor is more concerned with re-election and less concerned with developing the organization than the outsider and if he has a longer tenure than the outsider, then the insider puts place above career.

If the insider puts place above career, if the insider is removed before retirement age has been reached, then the insider often takes an existing or a newly created position in the same organization.

THEREFORE, if the inside successor is more concerned with re-election and less concerned with developing the organization than the outsider, then if the insider has been removed before the retirement age has been reached, then the insider often takes an existing or a newly created position in the same organization. This is materially equivalent to saying if the inside successor is more concerned with re-election and less concerned with developing the organization than the outsider and if he is removed before retirement age has been reached, then the insider often takes an existing or a newly created position in the same organization.

SET IIe Reference 05.

If the subordinate wooer has more targets with the insider due to the insider's clique of friends, then if the insider is more likely to conform to subordinate's wishes than outsiders, then an insider inherits the previous social system.

If the insider is more likely to conform to subordinate's wishes than outsider's, then an insider inherits the previous social system, and the social systems are not materially altered.

THEREFORE, if the subordinate wooer has more targets with the insider due to the insider's clique of friends, then the social system is not materially altered.

SET IIf References 05 and 19.

If the insider's integration into the group can be disruptive because of his new position, the insider's new authority commits him to his prior associates and isolates him more from the groups to which he did not previously belong.

If the insider's new authority commits him to his prior associates and isolates him more from the groups to which he did not previously belong, the insider's relationships within the organization will hinder his management of the internal interest group's struggles.

If the inside successor's relationships within the organization hinder his management of the internal interest group's struggles, then he does not actively or directly work to get support from the bottom and he is better able to manage his enemies than an outsider.

THEREFORE, if the insider's integration into the group can be disruptive because of his new position, then the insider doesn't actively or directly work to get support from the bottom and he is better able to manage his enemies than is the outsider.

SET IIg References 05, 19, and 79.

If the inside successor goes against the mandate to maintain the status quo, then if he will adopt techniques of strategic replacement, then he is constrained by friends and enemies alike.

If the insider is constrained by friends and enemies alike, then either little change will occur within the organization or the inside successor initiates chains of promotions with little effect on the organization.

THEREFORE, if the inside successor goes against the mandate to maintain the status quo and if he will adopt techniques of strategic replacement, either little change will occur within the organization or the inside successor's initiation of the chain of promotion will have little effect upon the organization.

Arguments from the Outside Successor Set

SET IIIa References 05, 16, 33, and 85.

If either the organization has a history of failure or the administration of the organization by the predecessor is perceived as being unsatisfactory, the outsider is not constrained by the predecessor's heritage of relationships.

If the outsider is not constrained by the predecessor's heritage of relationships, then the communication between the predecessor and the outside successor is not open.

If communication between the predecessor and the outside successor is not open, the outsider has been briefed on the predecessor's shortcomings and the outsider has been given a mandate to solve the problem specified by his superiors.

THEREFORE, if either the organization has a history of failure or the administration of the organization by the predecessor is perceived as being unsatisfactory, then the outside successor has been briefed on the predecessor's shortcomings and he has been given a mandate to solve the problem specified by his superior.

SET IIIb References 05, 16, 39, 60, and 63.

If either the board of control is insecure or if the board of control hires an outsider due to the lack of security, then the outsider is at first over-accepted and over-idealized.

If at first the outsider is over-accepted and over-idealized, then the outsider has a greater possibility of bargaining with the board than would an inside successor.

If the outside successor has a greater possibility to bargain with the board than an inside successor, then the outsider is paid more for the position than an insider and the group places a high and unrealistic expectation on him.

If the outsider is paid more for the position than an insider and if the group places a high and unrealistic expectation on him, the outsider will attempt to perform according to his superior's expectations.

If the outsider attempts to perform according to his superior's expectations, either the outsider fails to meet the expectations of the group or under greater stress the outsider will be fired to protect the board of control.

THEREFORE, if the outside successor is at first over-accepted and over-idealized, then either the outsider fails to meet the expectations of the group or under greater stress the outsider will be fired to protect the board of control.

SET IIIc References 05, 16, 25, and 63.

If at first the outsider is over-accepted and over-idealized and if the group places a high and unrealistic expectation upon him, then the outside successor has a greater possibility to bargain with the board and he is paid more for the position than is the insider.

If the outsider has a greater bargaining possibility with the board than the insider and if he is paid more for the position than the insider, then he is given considerable latitude in the operation of the organization and he is given full support during his first year in office.

If the outsider is given considerable latitude in the operation of the organization and if he is given full support during his first year in office, the interference from superiors present under the predecessor's reign comes to a halt with the successor and the outsider senses he will be evaluated by rational and impersonal means.

THEREFORE, if the outsider is at first over-accepted and over-idealized and if the group places a high and unrealistic expectation on the outsider, then the interference from superiors present under the predecessor's reign comes to a halt with the advent of the successor and the outsider senses he will be evaluated by rational and impersional means.

SET IIId References 05, 16, and 19.

If the outsider's ability and promise is idealized until proven otherwise and if his first few days in the organization are the crucial ones when sentiments may be changed, then his identification becomes organizational rather than personal and he is not constrained by the predecessor's heritage of relationships.

If his identification becomes organizational and if he is not constrained by his predecessor's relationships, then his administrative behavior becomes objective and impartial.

If the predecessor's organizational relations do not constrain him and he develops an objective and impartial manner of operation, then the organization becomes more bureaucratic and the outsider will emphasize hierarchy and status to replace the predecessor's old informal ties.

THEREFORE, during the period of idealization the outsider will tend to increase the organizational bureaucracy by emphasizing hierarchy and status.

SET IIIe References 04, 05, 13, and 40.

If the outsider has not served the organization in any lower capacity and if he has risen professionally by going to better positions or by collegial approval, then the outsider's career has been in two or more organizations.

If he has been in two or more organizations, then he has put his career above the place where he works and has considered himself expendable to the organization.

If this is true, then he views the successor who wants to remain in one organization as non-professional or it is harmful to both the individual and the organization if he remains too long or leaves too soon. Thus he sees advancement as moving from place to place.

If advancement is so conceived, then both he and the hiring board perceive him to be prepared by his training and experience.

If the outsider is prepared in such a way, then he may consider a place that has a high rate of succession as a place of real challenge.

If such organizations are seen as desirable, then it follows that outsiders are ready to move to better (career advancement) opportunities.

THEREFORE, if the outsider has not served the organization in any lower capacity and if he has risen professionally by going to better positions or by collegial approval, then he is ready to move to better (career advancement) opportunities.

SET IIIf References 05, 13, and 40.

If the outsider's career has been in two or more organizations and he is generally ready to move to better career opportunities, then he sees advancement as moving from place to place and he puts his career above the place in which he works.

If this is true, then he sees himself as being expendable.

If he is expendable, then he takes a high rate of succession as a challenge and rises professionally by going to better positions and by the approval he receives from his professional colleagues.

If this is how he views challenge and professional advancement, then any individual who wishes to remain in one organization or in one area is considered as non-professional by him.

THEREFORE, the outside successor whose career has been in two or more organizations and who is always ready to move to better opportunities will view the place-bound successor as being non-professional.

SET IIIg References 05, 16, and 19.

If the outsider is a stranger--unacquainted with the social realities--or if he is not constrained by his predecessor's heritage of relationships, then he is isolated from the informal sources of information and creates a new informal social circle.

If his isolation results in the creation of a new informal social circle, then the new circle provides him with information and a way of communicating to the organization.

If the new circle provides a means of obtaining information and a way to communicate, then the close supervision provided by the new circle further excludes the outsider from the social and communications system.

THEREFORE, if the outsider is a stranger, unacquainted with the social realities or if he is not constrained by his predecessor's heritage of relationships, then he is excluded from the informal social and communications system.

SET IIIh References 16, 51, and 63.

If the successor is inexperienced within the organization, is a stranger to the organization's social system, and lacks the necessary information and knowledge of the informal organization to gain entry, then the successor will emphasize hierarchy and status to replace the old informal ties.

If he emphasizes the hierarchy and status to replace the old informal ties, then he is unhampered by the informal social structure.

If he is unhampered by the old informal social structure, then he will come under attack from the old informal social structure.

If he comes under such attack, then he fails to meet the expectations of the group and he will have a more difficult time being accepted.

THEREFORE, if the outsider is inexperienced within the group, is a stranger to the organization's social system, and lacks the necessary information to gain entry, then he will fail to meet the expectations of the group and he will have a more difficult time being accepted.

Thus were the syllogistic arguments constructed from the matrices within the sets identified as Predecessor, Inside Successor, and Outside Successor. Whereas the formulization of these arguments was developed in accordance with Zetterberg's concepts of theory construction, the synthesization of the above within-set arguments was accomplished by utilizing the extended argument form, as described in the following chapter.

CHAPTER III

A PARTIAL THEORY OF EXECUTIVE SUCCESSION

According to Parsons, theories "...are made up of concepts and logically interrelated propositions."[1] Zetterberg stresses "...systematically interrelated propositions ...are theories,"[2] and Braithwaite's definition notes:

> A scientific theory is a deductive system in which the observable consequence logically follows from the conjunction of observed facts with a set of fundamental hypotheses of the system.[3]

Through utilization of such definitions each argument in the preceding chapter becomes a "miniature" theory[4] which may serve as a building block for constructing a theory of more inclusive scope. Each argument also has the utilitarian value of delineating the specific areas of research problems.[5] The "miniature" nature of these theories is noted by the limited number of generalized propositions.[6] The value of these theories is obviously found not only in the stated relationships but also in the indications as to what areas need further investigation.

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[1] Talcott Parsons. "An Outline of Social Systems," Vol. I Theories of Society, eds. T. Parsons, et. al. 3 vols., New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961, p. 32.

[2] Zetterberg, op. cit., p. 28.

[3] Richard B. Braithwaite. Scientific Explanation. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1964. p. 22.

[4] Zetterberg, op. cit., pp. 14-21.

[5] Zetterberg, ibid., pp. 14-15.

In this chapter some of the units and propositions of Chapter II are combined into theories which are more generalized but still "miniature" in scope. The three sets are no longer individually conceptualized but are reported separately. They are seen as impinging upon each other as environmental and behavioral structures which limit the direction and intensity of each actor's performance.

The Predecessor: The Determining Factor

The assumption is made that the leader who is dictatorially inclined will not in his early years in office be concerned with the succession problem. Death for him may not be imminent, but the struggle to maintain and increase his hold on the organization is constantly with him. It is to this task, establishing himself in early years, that he directs his attention and energies. He must deal with or coopt his enemies and placate his friends, while attempting to increase his own status, influence, and privileges. By the time he has been in office long enough to gain control over the major areas of possible threat, to the point at which he could give some thought to the problem of succession, he would put it aside as not a critical problem of the time or would see the selection and training of a successor as another Pandora's Box which could increase the role strain recently reduced. Eventually, the time arrives when he must face his own mortality and come to grips with the question of his successor.

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[6] It is assumed that a "grand" theory would be differentiated from the "miniature" theory by having a greater number of more inclusive propositions in a single area.

When the charismatic leader chooses a successor, either he must choose one who will not threaten the continuance of his reign, in which, of course, he can have no certitude, or he must be prepared to lose some or all of his power before he is ready to step down. Illogical as it is for him to increase the role strain by such a decision after he has spent so long and such energies reducing it, it is equally illogical not to provide for a successor, since without the continuity of leadership there is little hope that his magnum opus, the organization, will survive.

It may be argued that he may prefer to see everything destroyed rather than see another assume control of his masterpiece. While this is possible, the rarity of this situation eliminates it as a serious consideration here. It may, however, be part of the unconscious "choosing down" that will be discussed later.

The succession studies in history and political science[7] have made note of this dictatorial phenomenon, and when the assertions taken from this literature are related in the extended argument, the following pattern emerges: (In this argument the propositions and units are taken from arguments a, b, c, and d of Set I.)

> If the predecessor is a charismatic leader (dictator) who fails to pass on the power while he is still able to do so, or if he feels protective of the organizational structure and doubts that any major changes are possible, then if he fails to train a successor, then whoever does succeed him may change the direction of the regime.
>
> If the predecessor has had a long term in office and is dictatorially inclined, then if by forming a triad of himself, his selected successor, and a rival who will not threaten his present power or his future glory, or after establishing the triad he grants such power, then he may find it hard to prevent one or both from seizing more or all of the power.
>
> If the predecessor fails to train the successor for the position, then if he can't guarantee his choice of a successor who will be accepted, he may have to have a successor who owes his loyalty to another; or if he concentrates substantial power in the rival or establishes a triad, then he may find it hard to prevent one or both from seizing more or all of the power.
>
> THEREFORE, if the predecessor fails to pass on the power while he is still alive and able to do so or it is false to assume that he can choose a successor and a rival who will not threaten his present power or his future glory, then he will find it hard to prevent the seizure of more or all of the power and the successor's regime from following a different path than the one he intended.

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[7] See bibliographical entries 02, 03, 11, 45, 54, 66, 67, and 74 for a detailed account of succession problems in a dictatorship.

1. $(a5 \lor b10) \supset (b11 \supset a2)$
2. $(c1 \cdot c2) \supset \{[c4 \supset (c6 \cdot c7)] \supset a9\}$
3. $\{[b11 \supset (a11 \cdot a12)] \lor [(c5 \lor c4)]\} \supset a9$

$/\therefore (a5 \lor c{\sim}7) \supset a9$

In most cases leaders in complex organizations fail to hold the position or to wield the power described above. They are accountable to others rather than to themselves. Their right and privilege to select their successors is in keeping with one or more of the attributes of their character and leadership. Succinctly, these concepts may be brought together in the unit--the predecessor's organization is (is not) perceived by his superiors as being successful (unsuccessful).

It is noted in the literature[8] that if the predecessor has merited the trust and confidence of his superiors, then they will involve him in the selection of his successor; whereas, if the predecessor has failed to instill this trust and confidence, the superiors will never raise the question with him. Yet, with the successful leader's involvement, certain unexpressed restraints may be at work which limit his range of choice. It is necessary to stress that even if the successful predecessor functions as though he has complete choice of his successor, his superiors have not abdicated their authority but have allowed him the freedom as a sign of their continued confidence. His freedom is always directly related to their confidence in his judgment. The limitations noted here may be inferred from the literature and from selected arguments in the preceding chapter. The following extended argument was developed from arguments c, e, f, and g in Set I.

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[8] See bibliographical entry 58 for an explicit account of how boards allow predecessors to participate in the selection of the successor.

> If the predecessor has the power to select his successor or if he feels his recommendations will be accepted or if the predecessor is a statesman, then he will be allowed to determine the form of the succession but he will not be able to give his successor his personal authority, his political skill, or his good luck.
>
> If the predecessor will influence the board in the selection of his successor by indirect and informal means then he is a statesman.
>
> If the predecessor has the power to select his successor or if he feels that the board will accept his recommendations, then he will choose a successor who will not threaten his present power or his future glory.
>
> THEREFORE, if the predecessor in selecting his successor, chooses one who will threaten his present power and his future glory, then he does not have the power to select his successor or the board will not accept his recommendation.
>
> 1. $(eq \vee f2) \supset (f1 \vee e3)$
> 2. $g4 \supset f2$
> 3. $(e9 \supset c7) \; / \therefore {\sim}c7 \supset {\sim}e9$

Implicit within this argument are two notions: (1) boards of organizations with successful histories are reluctant to take undue chances in placing either their organizations or themselves in jeopardy, and (2) the literature with almost universal agreement stresses that succession, even if well planned and with a smooth transfer of power, is always disruptive. When these two are combined the obvious inference is that boards during times of perceived vulnerability will seek to maintain the status quo rather than chance a setback. Explicitly stated in this argument is another assertion, which Rush[9] intended for dictators--that a predecessor will not choose a successor who will threaten his present power or his future glory. It is assumed, however, that this unit has implications for more than just dictators or for those who were dictatorially inclined. The rationale for this assumption is as follows: If the board of a successful organization allows the predecessor to choose a successor who may threaten his own power and glory, then this implies that either the board does not perceive the predecessor's organization as being successful or that they do not wish to maintain the status quo. This may be symbolized as: $P \supset (\sim O \lor \sim M)$. But, if the predecessor's organization has not been successful, then the board will not be likely to rely on his judgment in selecting a successor with leadership ability when they perceive that this is the quality he lacks. Or, if the organization has been successful and succession is disruptive in itself, then the board will not wish to bring in a successor who will further aggravate the problem. Another way to say the same thing is: If the board of a successful organization allows the predecessor to choose a successor who may threaten his own power and glory, then it is false that the predecessor's organization is successful and they wish to maintain the status quo. This assertion is symbolized as: $P \supset \sim(O \cdot M)$. By using DeMorgan's theorem the two assertions are seen symbolically as logical equivalents.

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[9] Myron Rush, "The Khruschev Succession Problem," World Politics. January, 1962, p. 180.

$$[P \equiv (\sim O \vee \sim M)] \equiv [P \equiv \sim(O \cdot M)]$$

While the two assertions are equivalent, the predicate terms are not in keeping with the subject terms according to the present state of knowledge, but this needs to be empirically tested.

Also suppressed in this argument is another proposition regarding how the successful leader establishes the criteria for choosing his successor. It would appear that whatever the expressed intention of the predecessor is in the selection of a creative, responsible successor, he will in fact select one who is less capable than himself. The effect of such "choosing down" is that the status quo is not and cannot in fact, be maintained. The dynamic activities under the leadership of the predecessor which lead to the apparent success of the organization will be lessened under the successor, who, even if he has all the necessary administrative skills, will lack the personal power, the political image, and the good fortune of his predecessor.

This rationale offers, in part, an explanation into the phenomenon Carlson[10] noted when he described the effect of having too many inside successors in a row.

As the literature identifies and, in part, examines the role of the successful leader, so it also notes the effect of the unsuccessful leader, which is especially noticeable when the leader is exposed to pressures from both his superiors and his subordinates. Under such conditions the leader is likely to meet his social and psychological needs by forming associations which may extend the complete range of the organization, or he may focus on only one segment. One group may contain some or all of his superiors, whose association with him may date from before the time they selected him as the successor. Another group may consist of old friends who ascended in the hierarchy with him.[11] Still another group may be composed primarily of nonstatus personnel. On these friendship relations will depend the predecessor's influence in the selection of a successor and the influence he has on the successor's behavior and administration.

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[10] Richard O. Carlson, Executive Succession and Organizational Change. Chicago: Midwest Administration Center, University of Chicago, 1962, pp. 72-77.

[11] For the insider such associates may be those who supported his advancement or those who advanced with his effort. In the case of the outsider, he may create this group by strategic replacement, that is, by replacing the predecessor's loyal subordinates with old friends who he perceives are loyal to him.

Whereas the effects of friendship choices may vary with the consequences of succession, prediction is directional if the predecessor dies in office, or if his tenure is short, or if he fails to solve the problems confronting the organization. These are noted directly and by inference in the following argument which was formulated by combining arguments h, i, j, and k in Set I.

> If the predecessor was generally unpopular or was popular with a clique, or if the predecessor was seen as a favorite of the old board of control, then the predecessor will have little influence on the successor's orientation toward change and more than likely the successor will be an outsider who will not be constrained by the predecessor's heritage of relationships.
>
> If the predecessor's tenure was short or if he did not have the solution to the crisis problem, then he is not approached by the board to assist in the selection of a successor.
>
> If the predecessor dies in office or if his death is unanticipated, then the successor will not be constrained by the predecessor's heritage of relationships.
>
> THEREFORE, if either the predecessor was generally unpopular, or if his tenure was short, or if he dies in office, then the successor will not be constrained by the predecessor's heritage of relationships.
>
> 1. $(i4 \vee j5) \supset [j1 \cdot (h2 \cdot h1)]$
> 2. $(h7 \vee h5) \supset i2$
> 3. $(k5 \vee k4) \supset h1 \;/ \therefore\; [(i4 \vee h7) \vee k5] \supset h1$

The second premise of the above extended argument supports the contention noted previously that the unsuccessful predecessor's assistance is not sought at the time of successor selection. It also may be inferred that time is essential in establishing the confidence of the board so that predecessors with short tenure cannot be expected to influence either the choice of the successor or the direction the organization will take. It may also be inferred that the length of tenure may be of little importance if he loses grace with his superiors or if he fails to meet an organizational crisis. The fact that an outside successor functions as a specialist may account to a degree for the short tenure phenomenon in which organizational goals alone dictate the terms of his employment. This point will be discussed more fully in a later section.

The Successor: Destroyer or Creator

The theme presented thus far has been a dichotomy showing the predecessor either as a successful or unsuccessful leader. In this section a distinction is made between the inside successor who, upon following the successful predecessor, was unable to maintain the status quo as he was commissioned to do, and the outside successor who, upon following the unsuccessful predecessor, was given the mandate to solve the organizational problems. This distinction is expanded upon in the following sections.

The Destroyer: The Insider Who Fails to Maintain the Status Quo

The predecessor has been identified in the previous section as the one who sets the stage for the successor and the organization. The effectiveness of the successor's administration and the goal achievement of the organization will depend on how the predecessor has administered the organization and upon his role in the selection of the successor. Shakespeare has Antony say, "The evil that men do lives after them...." and in complex organizations both the good and evil deeds are apparent in the role of the predecessor when they influence the career of the successor and the organization. While this may be inferred, it is in need of intensive empirical study. It is more apparent, however, when the predecessor upon "stepping down" does not leave the organization but takes another or a lower position. His presence in either case acts as a deterrent to the initiative and creativity of the successor. When the successor's experience has been confined to one organization, one set of procedures, or one objective, then the constraining forces exercised by the predecessor increase. In such a case the successor, by virtue of his relationships within the organization will refrain from upsetting the system which brought him to his new office even if he sees the necessity of change.

When arguments a, b, c, and d of Set II are combined in an extended argument, support is generated for the concept of a structurally limited insider.

> If the inside predecessor is either succeeded by an inside successor or given an existing or newly created position in the same organization, then either the predecessor's presence acts to stabilize the successor's orientation to change or the organization's reaction to the successor will depend upon the relationships established by the predecessor.
>
> Now, if the inside successor has held a position in only one organization, then he tends to be second in influence within the organization before his succession; but if the inside successor forms ties with the board of control before assuming office and if he is more controlled by the board and staff than an outside successor would be, then he will maintain the status quo.
>
> If he will maintain the status quo, then either he will be more concerned with re-election and less with developing the organization than would an outsider, or the inside successor puts the place where he works above his career.
>
> THEREFORE, if the inside predecessor takes an existing or newly created position in the same organization, then the inside successor will maintain the status quo and he will be more concerned with his re-election and less with the development of the organization than would an outside successor.
>
> 1. $(a4 \lor a5) \supset (a2 \lor a3)$
> 2. $[(b2 \supset b9) \cdot (c3 \cdot c2)] \supset c4$
> 3. $c4 \supset (d3 \lor d4) \;/ \therefore\; a5 \supset (c4 \cdot d3)$

The constraining forces exerted upon the inside successor are assumed to be superior to any influence he can muster. When these constraints are fully considered, three agencies are involved--the predecessor, who bequeaths his formal and informal organization; the board, which issues directives of what the successor may or may not be expected to do; and the subordinates, who exert group pressure on the successor to maintain or extend their own status and position.

If it is true that the successor will maintain the status quo because of these forces and others, then the very fact that these forces are imposed upon the successor when they have not, in the same degree, been imposed on the predecessor leads to the inference that the status quo cannot be maintained. By way of example, if predecessor A's successor, B, is constrained by A's organization, then if B is less free or does not have the freedom to perform as A performed, then B cannot maintain the same organization that A maintained. Now, if B also has an inside successor, C, who is likewise constrained, then A's organization is further diluted. The dilution of the organization is neither rapid nor obvious since the inside successor's tenure tends to extend over a long period of time. Also, since the insider is concerned about staying in one organization he will cooperate more readily with both his superiors and subordinates to maintain their support. But the longer this is done, the more he must compromise the needs and goals of the organization for the needs and expectations of its members. Such compromising may in time maneuver the organization into a position where a purging outsider must be brought in.

Now, to assert that the status quo can be maintained, dubious as it is with the insider, becomes even more so when additional constraining factors are considered. It is obvious that the insider's compliance with the wishes of both those above and below him tends to reduce his vulnerability; it also tends to reduce the status quo. Both vulnerability and tenure gain support as limiting factors when units of arguments a, b, c, and d for Set II are formulated in the following extended argument:

> If either the predecessor's presence acts to stabilize the successor's orientation for change or the insider was picked for fast career movement when he entered the organization, then the insider will maintain the status quo and he will have a longer tenure than would an outsider.
>
> If he maintains the status quo and if he has a longer tenure than the outsider, then either the insider's established relations in the organization make him less vulnerable than the outsider or the insider has proven his mettle in a number of difficult assignments in some area of the organization.
>
> THEREFORE, if the insider's established relationships in the organization make him less vulnerable than the outsider, then he will have a longer tenure than the outsider.
>
> 1. $(a2 \vee b7) \supset (c4 \cdot d5)$
> 2. $(c4 \cdot d5) \supset (c5 \vee b5) \;/ \therefore\; c5 \supset d5$

This argument explicitly states that the insider at one time has shown ability by being picked for fast career movement and by his being able to handle a number of difficult assignments. It also implies that soon his commitments to the members of the organization will create a security he is loath to lose.

As the insider's star ascends within the organization he will be approached both directly and indirectly through his clique of friends by those who wish to better their positions. Even his enemies may pay court to him and his friends, if the ascent is rapid enough. As long as the inside successor is in favor or in power, he will be able to exercise some control over the subordinates, but as with most things, a maneuver which attempts to contain the activities of another also exercises constraints on the initiator.[12] Since this equilibrium exists, little change either in the formal organization or in the social system is to be expected immediately. This is not to be confused with saying that it will remain the same as it was under the predecessor. It is assumed that gains and losses are made in both structures over a period of time and this is in contrast to the apparent rapid change in the succession of the outsider. Again, by combining units from arguments b, c, e, f, and g in Set II, the following logical form is constructed:

> If the wooer has more targets with the insider than with the outsider because of the insider's clique

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[12] As an example, when a rule-maker attempts to limit the activity, mobility or area of influence of another he is also constrained by being forced to conform to his own rules. See bibliographic entry 52 on how codifying the laws of succession presented Alfonso the Learned with a disruptive dilemma.

> of friends and if the successor tends to be the second in influence within the organization, then insiders are better able to manage their enemies than are outsiders.
>
> But, if the insider is most likely to conform to his subordinates' wishes than is the outsider and if an insider who attempts to change the organization is constrained by friends and enemies alike, then this is materially equivalent to saying that the insider is controlled more by the board and staff than is the outsider.
>
> Now, if either the insider is more controlled by the board and staff than is the outsider or if he attempts to go against the mandate to maintain the status quo, then either little change will occur within the organization or the social systems are not materially altered.
>
> THEREFORE, if the insider conforms to the wishes of both the board and the staff, then little change will occur within the organization and this is materially equivalent to saying that if the inside successor is constrained by friends and enemies alike, the social system is not materially altered.
>
> 1. $(e1 \; . \; b9) \supset f7$
> 2. $(e2 \; . \; g2) \equiv c4$
> 3. $(c4 \vee g1) \supset (g5 \vee e5) \; / \therefore \; (c4 \supset g5) \equiv (g2 \supset e5)$

Within the successor's clique of friends and wooers there may be some who were personally close and loyal to the predecessor and who may either resist the successor at first or continue to resist him even beyond a respectful period of mourning for the predecessor. It is when this latter group of determined resisters persist that the successor may either have to replace them or bow to their wishes. In either case the inside successor's intention would be to obtain the acceptance and support of his subordinates. In the following extended argument developed from arguments a, b, c, f, and g of Set II additional limiting constraints are noted:

> If the successor inherits the predecessor's old lieutenants who were personally close and loyal to him and if the subordinates enjoyed the organization under the predecessor, then either the successor encounters resistance to his proposed changes or his legitimacy will be questioned for a short time, after which the subordinates will be amenable to change.
>
> If the successor encounters resistance to his proposed changes, then either he can bring the old lieutenants around by strategic replacement with his old friends and by creating a new informal social group or he fails to replace key personnel and becomes more dependent upon the subordinates.
>
> If the subordinates become amenable to change, then either they are bureaucratic subordinates who are less likely to have strong commitments to the predecessor or the subordinates will establish a new order of priorities.
>
> Now, if the old lieutenants cannot be replaced, then they can damage the successor's position and can bring the rank and file against him or if the subordinates make the decisions in the organization, then the successor will face the task of maintaining and extending the subordinates' expectations.
>
> THEREFORE, if the successor inherits the predecessor's old lieutenants who were personally close and loyal to him, then either the subordinates will be amenable to change or the successor will face the task of maintaining and extending the subordinates' expectations.
>
> 1. $(b9 \cdot n2) \supset [b8 \vee (a7 \supset a3)]$
> 2. $b8 \supset [(b7 \cdot b6) \vee (f7 \cdot f5)]$
> 3. $a3 \supset [(a1 \vee a5)]$
> 4. $[d14 \supset (d6 \cdot d4)] \vee (f2 \supset f1) \; / \therefore b6 \supset (a3 \vee f1)$

It was noted above that a predecessor cannot be certain that his choice of a successor will follow his wishes. In conjunction with this the successor cannot expect that the replacements he brings into the organization will give him the support he expects and needs.

Even though the replacements may give the needed support, an argument may be developed to the effect that there is little difference between the task the successor faces with the replacement and dealing with those subordinates to whom he must cater. The difference, in degree not kind, is that both groups have expectations which the successor must maintain, or even extend, if he is to accomplish the tasks he sets for himself and the organization. The successor will face the risk of failure where subordinate expectations and organizational goals are in opposition.

When the major concepts for the two sets of Predecessor and Inside Successor are combined, the direction the organization will take in a succession crisis is apparent. That is, if the predecessor who has the privilege of choosing his successor, selects one who is less capable or is controllable, and if the successor is constrained by the predecessor's heritage of relationships or faced with meeting the expectations of the predecessor, the board and the subordinates, then the status of the organization will not and cannot persist.[13] It has been noted that succession in any form, is disruptive; and if this is true, then one may hypothesize that over the course of an organization's history the succession of insider after insider will be more dysfunctional than any other succession pattern.

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[13] The concept of the status quo may be viable to individuals within the organization regarding their status and position but it can only doubtfully be considered as viable to the organization as a whole. Changes occur in personnel, even if this involves only one person, in administration and in the direction of the entire system. The status quo could be maintained if and only if the successor were an exact duplicate of the predecessor. This

The degree of dysfunction occurring from the succession will vary with the degree of difference between the predecessor's career and the successor's career. Or, the greater the similarity in career patterns between the predecessor and the successor the less dysfunctional will be the consequences of succession. If this is true, it may further be hypothesized that at some as yet undefined point the dysfunctional consequences of insider-insider succession, no matter how harmonious the career patterns appear to be, would become so traumatic that the next successor must come from the outside. It is to this position of the outsider that the final section is devoted.

The Creator: A Structured Newcomer[14]

The assumption is made in this section that once an

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may be the hope of the predecessor who makes his appointment well in advance so that he has time to train the successor in his image and likeness, but the results are still dubious.

[14] In this section "newcomer" will be used interchangeably with the terms "outside successor" and "outsider." He is seen as the one brought into the organization from the outside to initiate change within the system.

organization falls within a certain range of instability, drastic measures are needed if it is to be rejuvenated, to achieve its goals, or to survive at all. Under such conditions a search begins for a successor who possesses the knowledge and ability to unite the factions and to give direction to the organization. If a string of insiders has not been able to meet the administrative challenge, the loss of confidence forces the search committee to go outside the organization. In taking such action the committee must deal with a greater unknown than they had faced before--the outsider's record of experience and training. They can look at the degree of success of the organization with which he has been associated, and they can obtain collegial recommendations, but they cannot be sure of what he has done or can do. The tendency under such circumstances will be to see in him qualities he does not possess and to expect of him more than he may be able to accomplish. If this does occur, the skills of the outsider may never be utilized; or if they are, they may be exploited until that time when he is discarded for another leader who can take the organization one more step toward recovery.

By combining arguments a and b in Set III support is built for this assumption:

> If the organization has had a history of failure

or if the predecessor's administration of the organization was unsatisfactory, then the successor is briefed on the predecessor's shortcomings and he is given a mandate to solve the problems specified by the superiors.

Now, if the organization has a history of failure or if the unsatisfactory administration of the organization by the predecessor resulted in the board's developing a feeling of insecurity from either the internal or external pressures or if they hire an outsider because of this lack of security, then they will over-accept and over-idealize him; then because of the over-acceptance and over-idealization of the successor, he will be unable to meet their expectations; or even if he succeeds and still their insecurity increases, they will fire him to protect themselves.

THEREFORE, either if the organization has had a history of failure or if the predecessor's administration has been unsatisfactory, then the outside successor will be unable to meet his superior's expectations or even if he succeeds and still their insecurity increases, they will fire the successor to protect themselves.

1. $(a6 \vee a1) \supset (a4 \cdot a2)$
2. $(a6 \vee a1) \supset \{[(b8 \vee b9) \supset b13] \supset (b14 \vee b10)\}$
   $/ \therefore (a6 \vee a1) \supset (b14 \vee b10)$

We may infer that if, under the freedom to function, the outsider is able to meet his superior's expectations and is able to reduce their insecurity, then they will evaluate him by rational and impersonal means. If on the other hand he meets their expectations but is unable to reduce their insecurity (that is, if no matter what he is able to do in resolving the internal and external pressures, the insecurity of the superiors persists or increases), then the successor will be confronted with interference from above and the evaluation of him will be subjective. This relationship will continue to the point at which he is made their scapegoat and fired.

When arguments e and f of Set III are combined and when arguments d and g of Set III are combined, the above assertion is clarified and extended.

> If the outsider has not served the organization in any lower capacity and if he advances professionally by going to better positions or by collegial approval, then he is generally ready to move to a new position and if he has been in two or more organizations and if he is generally ready to move to better positions, then he sees the successor who wants to remain in one organization as unprofessional.
>
> Either the outsider has not served the organization in any lower capacity and he rises professionally by moving to a better position or receives collegial approval or he has been in two or more organizations and is generally ready to move to better positions.
>
> THEREFORE, either the outsider is generally ready to move to better positions or he sees the successor who wants to remain in one organization as unprofessional.
>
> 1. $[(e1 \cdot e5) \supset e11] \cdot [(f2 \cdot f11) \supset f6]$
> 2. $(e1 \cdot e5) \vee (f2 \cdot f11) \; / \therefore e11 \vee f6$

and,

> If the outsider's ability and promise are idealized until proven otherwise and his first few days are crucial when sentiments may be changed, then the outsider will tend to increase the bureaucratic structure of the organization and he will emphasize the hierarchy and status to replace the old informal ties; if the outsider is a stranger unacquainted with the social realities or if he is not constrained by the predecessor's heritage of relationships, then his use of close supervision will exclude him from the informal social and communication system.
>
> Now, either the outsider's ability and promise are idealized until proven otherwise and his first few days are crucial when sentiments may be changed or he is a stranger unacquainted with the social realities or he is not constrained by the predecessor's heritage or relationships.

THEREFORE, either the outsider's close supervision excludes him from the informal social and communication system or he will tend to increase the bureaucratic structure and will emphasize the hierarchy and the status to replace the old informal ties.

1. $[(d7 . d1) \supset (d5 . d6)] . [(g1 \vee g4) \supset g17]$
2. $(d7 . d1) \vee (g1 \vee g4) \;/ \therefore\; g17 \vee (d5 . d6)$

Since the outsider sees that staying too long in one organization is not good for either the individual or the organization, it may be inferred that the outsider considers himself to have special talents which when exhausted dictate that he move on. By contrast the insider may be seen to have no special talents but is either a "general practitioner" or sees his strength as being "in his relations with people." The specialist, then, is not or does not wish to be either a general administrator or people-oriented. It is likely that when the organization's directors realize the precarious condition of the organization they either rationally or intuitively establish a set of organizational priorities that must be met if the organization is to recoup its losses. The first outside successor may be hired to find the solution to the first priority; when his task is complete, he will be replaced with a specialist for the second priority and so on. This process of exploiting the outsider is in harmony with the outside successor's desires and with the needs of the organization.

At some point in time when the major problems of the organization seem to be under control, the directors will again select a successor who is from the inside. It might be inferred from the above that an outsider with a greater degree of specialization should be preferred over the non-specialist insider. But, in a way, the insider may be viewed as a specialist when he enters the leadership role after a series of outsiders. That is, when an organization has experienced the specialized focus of a series of outsiders in technological development, marketing, finance, external affairs, etc., it has also experienced a disruptive breakdown in both the informal social and communications network. This would be especially true if outsiders have shorter tenures than do insiders.[15] Once the primary difficulties specified by the board have been solved, the insider can again be brought in to rebuild the internal harmony which has been disrupted. This assumption is developed clearly in Set III, argument h in which it is noted that the outsider who fails to meet the group's expectations (because he is attending to the problem he has been commissioned to solve) has difficulty in being accepted, but his concern is not so much with acceptance as it is with the problem at hand.

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[15] It has been noted by some writers of succession that the outsider is more concerned with the lack of loyalty than is the insider. As has been noted, the insider has a group within the organization which fulfills this loyalty need, but the outsider may have a career need rather than a social need for the loyalty he seeks. He may need to have the organizational machinery to accomplish the task set for him and may see loyalty as the key to an effective and efficient machine.

In each case the insider's and outsider's behavior has been in response to conditions established by the predecessor. Where each predecessor sets the stage for those that follow, each successor may be viewed as beginning the predecessor's role as soon as he takes office. The disruption of succession appears, then, to be endemic to the position of the predecessor and transmitted to his successor.

CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study was undertaken with a two-fold purpose--to construct a partial theory of succession, and to utilize a method of theory construction which combines some of the concepts of Hans Zetterberg with the principles of formal symbolic logic.

To achieve these purposes the following steps were accomplished: A bibliography on succession in complex organizations was compiled and published, with entries from the various disciplines of the social sciences, business, and education, representing both descriptive and empirical studies. From these works propositions were abstracted and categorized by units into 91 sets and subsets according to key words contained within the literature. A matrix was constructed for each set and subset by a special 360 computer program. From each matrix hypothetical syllogisms were formed which, while hypothetical, employed other connectives so as to utilize as many of the units as possible within each matrix. The three major sets of Predecessor, Inside Successor, and Outside Successor along with their subsets were selected to be reported in this work. Where the hypothetical syllogisms were reported in ordinary language with no interpretation or symbolic representation, the extended arguments developed within each major set were discussed and their symbolic argument forms were provided. The partial theory thus developed was miniature in scope but broad enough to illustrate the interrelation between the units and concrete enough to serve as a basis for further study.

Two general propositions and their directional hypotheses inferred from this study are reported below:

1. The degree and level of the predecessor's participation in successor selection varies with his success as a leader and the length of his tenure.
    a) The higher the degree and level of the predecessor's participation in successor selection, the greater the likelihood he will choose a successor less capable than himself.
    b) The higher the degree and level of the predecessor's participation in successor selection, the greater will be the constraints placed on the successor to maintain the status quo.
    c) The higher the degree and level of the predecessor's participation in successor selection, the longer he will postpone naming his successor and the shorter the time between the naming and the successor taking office.
    d) The more successful the predecessor is perceived to be and the longer his tenure, the greater will be the constraints the subordinates placed upon him in selecting the successor who will maintain the status quo, and the more the subordinates will constrain

the successor who attempts to deviate from it.

2. The successor's deviation from the status quo will vary with the number and the intensity of the constraints placed upon him.
    a) The fewer and the less intense the constraints placed upon the successor to maintain the status quo, the more likely he will deviate from it.
    b) When few highly intense constraints are imposed upon the successor to maintain the status quo, the less able the successor will be to maintain it.
    c) The greater the number and the intensity of the constraints placed on the successor to maintain the status quo, the less able the successor will be to maintain it.
    d) When the number of constraints are many but tne intensity is low, the more likely the successor will be to deviate from the status quo.

As a preliminary study this work provides the basis for further theoretical and empirical investigations into the phenomenon of succession and into the utilization of the extended argument form of symbolic logic as a methodology in the social sciences.

In the future, greater attention needs to be paid to the utilization of computers in abstracting and categorizing propositions (necessitating investigation of the implications of linguistic analysis), in refining computerized matrix construction, and in the machine validation of extended arguments. Finally, it is evident that with the advancement of these technologies the synthesizing of large bodies of knowledge must occupy the time and effort of research scholars.

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The predecessor is charismatic.
The regime may seek a revolutionary solution.
The regime may continue under a different form (improved efficiency).
The charismatic leader (dictator) fails to pass on power while still alive.
The regime may pattern like organization which appears to be effective.
The predecessor will be able to determine the form of succession.

04 Carlson, Richard O. "Succession and Performance Among School Superintendents." *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 6:210-227 (Sept., 1961).

The insider often takes existing or newly created position in same organization.
The insider is removed before retirement age has been reached.
The insider has not served organization in any lower capacity.

05 Carlson, Richard O. *Executive Succession and Organizational Change*. Chicago: Midwest Administrative Center, University of Chicago, 1962.

The predecessor's term in office is long.

The outsider is not constrained by predecessor's heritage of relationships.
The successor will probably be an outsider.
The predecessor is a statesman.
The predecessor's administration of organization is perceived as satisfactory by the board.
The insider is more concerned with re-election and less with developing organization than is the outsider.
The insider puts place above career.
The insider change agent goes against mandate to maintain status quo.
The insider change agent is constrained by friends and enemies alike.
Little change will occur within the organization.
The insider gives attention to old rules to reaffirm status quo.
The insider is controlled more by board and staff than outsider.
The wooer has more targets with insider because of insider's clique of friends.
The insider is more likely to conform to subordinate's wishes than outsider.
The insider inherits previous social system.
The social systems are not materially altered.
The insider's reliance within organization hinders management of internal interest group struggle.
The insider doesn't actively or directly work to get support from bottom.
The insider is better able to manage his enemies than is the outsider.
The insider is older in first position than outsider.
The insider has held position in only one organization.
The insider is succeeded by an outsider.
The outsider is a stranger, unacquainted with social realities of the situation.
The outsider is given full support during first year in office.
The outsider has a greater possibility to bargain with the board than the insider.
The outsider is paid more for the position than is insider.
The outsider sees himself as expendable.
The outsider puts career above place.
The outsider's career has been in two or more organizations.

The outsider's identity becomes organizational rather than personal.
The outsider is not constrained by predecessor's heritage of relationships.
The outsider's ability and promise is idealized until proven otherwise.

06 Christensen, C. R. *Management Succession in Small and Growing Enterprises*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953.

The predecessor may not have time or ability to train successor.
The predecessor is generally in a position to refuse to retire.

07 Cohen, A. M. and Bemis, W. G. "Continuity of Leadership in Communication Networks." *Human Relations*, 14:351-368 (Nov., 1961).

08 Deprin, L. C. *Superintendent Succession and Administrative Patterns*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Arizona, 1965.

09 Dimock, Marshall E. and Hyde, Howard K. "Executive Appointment in Private and Public Bureaucracies." *Reader in Bureaucracy*. Edited by Robert K. Merton, *et al*. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952.

10 Dommermuth, William P. "On the Odds of Becoming Company President." *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (May-June, 1966), pp. 65-72.

The insider spends the majority of career in one field coming up through the ranks.
The insider has proven his mettle in a number of difficult assignments in some area of the organization.
The insider is given short, diversified experience beyond his own, specialty in organization.
The insider is picked for fast career movement when he enters the organization.

11 Drachkovitch, M. M. "Succession and the Charismatic Leader in Yugoslavia." *Journal of International Affairs*, 1:54-66 (1964).

The predecessor cannot bequeath personal authority, political skill, or good luck to successor.

12 Flagg, J. T., Jr. The Organizational Climate of Schools: Its Relationship to Pupil Achievement, Size of School and Teacher Turnover. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Rutgers University, 1964.

13 Floro, George K. "Continuity in City-Manager Careers." American Journal of Sociology, 61:240-246, 1955.

The outsider feels it harmful to self and profession to move too soon or stay too long.
The outsider is thought to be prepared by training and experience.
The successor who wants to remain in one organization is considered nonprofessional by outsiders.
The outsider rises professionally by going to better positions or by collegial approval.
The outsider may take the high rate of succession as a challenge.
The outsider sees advancement as moving from place to place.

14 Gamson, William A. and Scotch, Norman A. "Scapegoating in Baseball." American Journal of Sociology, 70:69-72 (July, 1964).

15 Gordon, Gerald and Becker, Selwyn. "Organizational Size and Managerial Succession: A Re-examination." American Journal of Sociology, 70:215-222 (Sept., 1964).

16 Gouldner, Alvin. Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954.

The outsider creates a new informal social circle.
The successor's new social circle provides him with information and communication denied by formal organization.
The outsider emphasizes hierarchy and status to replace old informal ties.
The outsider is a stranger to the organization's social system.
The outsider is unhampered by informal social structure.
The outsider lacks necessary information and knowledge of informal organization to gain entry.
Close supervision excludes outsider from informal social and communications systems.

The outsider senses he will be evaluated by rational and impersonal means.
The outsider attempts to perform according to superior's expectations.
The outsider will tend to increase bureaucratization.
The outsider emphasizes hierarchy and status to replace old informal ties.

17 Gouldner, Alvin. "The Problem of Succession and Bureaucracy." Studies in Leadership. New York: Harper and Bros., 1950.

18 Grusky, Oscar. "Managerial Succession and Organizational Effectiveness." American Journal of Sociology, 69:21-31 (July, 1963).

19 Grusky, Oscar. "Administrative Succession in Formal Organizations." Social Forces, 39:105-115 (December, 1960).

The predecessor will have little influence on successor's orientation toward change.
The predecessor had outside recognition of successful performance.
The predecessor's death stops transfer of accumulated organizational knowledge.
The predecessor's death destroys organizational influence and introduces a discontinuity into the system.
The predecessor's death is not anticipated.
The predecessor dies in office.
The insider will adopt technique of strategic replacement.
The insider's integration into the group can be disruptive because of new position.
The insider's authority further isolates him from the group to which he previously did not belong.
The insider's new authority commits him to prior associates and isolates him more from the rest.
The predecessor's presence acts to stabilize the successor's orientation for change.
The outsider is isolated from informal sources of information.
The outsider can initially subscribe to the position of objectivity and impartiality.

20 Grusky, Oscar. "The Effects of Administrative Succession. An excerpt from 'Role, Conflict in Organization: A Study of Prison Camp Officials.'" Administrative Science Quarterly, 3:463-467 (March, 1959).

21 Grusky, Oscar. "Reply." American Journal of Sociology, 70:222 (Sept., 1964).

22 Grusky, Oscar. "Reply." American Journal of Sociology, 70:72-76 (July, 1964).

23 Grusky, Oscar. "The Effects of Succession: A Comparative Study of Military and Business Organizations." The New Military: Changing Patterns of Organizations. Edited by Morris Janowitz. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964.

24 Grusky, Oscar. "Corporate Size, Bureaucratization, and Managerial Succession." American Journal of Sociology, 67:261-269 (Nov., 1961).

25 Guest, Robert H. Organization Changes: The Effect of Successful Leadership. Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1962.

The outsider is given considerable latitude in his operation.
Interference from above under predecessor comes to a halt with successor.
Outsider's first few days, when sentiments may be changed, are crucial to success.

26 Guest, Robert H. "Managerial Succession in Complex Organizations." American Journal of Sociology, 68:47-55 (July, 1962).

27 Hagen, Welles. "Succession and Personalities in India." Journal of International Affairs, 1:21-31 (1964).

28 Hamblin, Robert L. "Leadership and Crises." Sociometry, 21:322-325 (December, 1958).

The predecessor does not have solution to crisis problem.
The successor will tend to be second in influence within the organization.

29 Harries-Jones, Peter and Chirvale, J. C. "Kasaka: A Case Study in Succession and Dynamics of a Bemba Village." *Rhodes-Livingston Journal*, 33: 1-67 (January, 1963).

30 Hartley, H. J. *Bureaucracy and Local-Cosmopolitan Orientation Examined with Selected Criterion Variables*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1964.

31 Heidenheimer, Arnold J. "Succession and Party Politics in West Germany." *Journal of International Affairs*, 1:32-42 (1964).

32 Henry, L. L. *Presidential Transitions*. Washington, D. C. The Brookings Institution, 1960.

33 Henry, L. L. "Transferring the Presidency: Variations, Trends, and Patterns." *Public Administration Review*, 20:187-194 (Autumn, 1960).

Communication between predecessor and outside successor is not open.
Predecessor sees successor as uninformed.
Predecessor feels protective of organizational structures and doubts possibility of major change.
Predecessor's tenure is short.

34 Hoffman, Stanley S. "Succession and Stability in France." *Journal of International Affairs*, 1: 86-103 (1964).

35 Jackson, Jay M. "The Effect of Changing the Leadership of Small Work Groups." *Human Relations*, 6:25-44 (February, 1953).

36 Jacobs, Robert C. *et al*. "The Perpetuation of an Arbitrary Tradition through Several Generations of a Laboratory Microculture." *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 62:649-658 (May, 1961).

37 Joel, L. G. *An Analysis of Leadership Chracteristics in Relationship to the Tenure of Successful School Superintendent in Connecticut*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Connecticut, 1965.

38 Jelenski, K. A. "Tendencias que aspiran a La Sucesion en España." Unpublished paper, cited in "Succession and Ideology in Spain and Portugal," by Deith Botsford.

39 Kammerer, G. M. *et al*. *The Urban Political Community*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963.

Insiders have longer tenure than outsiders.
The insider forms ties with board of control before assuming office.
The board of control is insecure.
The board of control hired outsider because of lack of security.
Under greater stress outsider will be fired to protect board of control.

40 Kammerer, G. M. *et al*. *City Managers in Politics*. Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1962.

The insider's established relationships in the organization make him less vulnerable than the outsider.
The successor is generally ready to move to better opportunity.

41 Katz, E. *et al*. "Leadership Stability and Social Change: An Experiment with Small Groups." *Sociometry*, 20:36-50 (1957).

42 Kelley, Harold. "Communication in Experimentally Created Hierarchies." *Human Relations*, 4:39-56 (1951).

43 Kirkendall, Richard S. *A Discriminate Analysis of Social and Political Indicators of Changing Political Structures of School Boards*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, Claremont, California, 1966.

44 Kimche, Jon. "Succession and the Legacy in Israel." *Journal of International Affairs*, 1:43-53 (1964).

45 Kline, Donald W. "Succession and the Elite in Peking." *Journal of International Affairs*, 1:1-11 (1964).

46 Kriesberg, Louis. "Careers, Organization Size, and Succession." *American Journal of Sociology*, 68: 355-359 (November, 1962).

47 Langenderfer, H. Q. "Egyptian Executive: A Study in Conflict." *Human Organizations*, 24:89-95 (Spring, 1965).

48 Levenson, Bernard. "Bureaucratic Succession." *Complex Organizations: A Sociological Reader*. Edited by A. Etzioni. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1961.

The predecessor fails to train successor for his position.
The predecessor may later have to fill the position with one who owes loyalty to another.

49 Leventman, S. "Class and Ethnic Tensions: Minority Group Leadership in Transition." *Sociology and Social Research*, 50:371-376 (April, 1966).

50 Lipset, S. M. "The Problem of Succession." *Political Man*. New York: Doubleday and Company, 1960.

51 Lipset, S. M. *Agrarian Socialism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950.

The successor is inexperienced within the organization.

52 MacDonald, R. A. "Alfonso the Learned and Succession: A Father's Dilemma." *Speculum*, 40:647-653 (Oct., 1965).

53 Maier, Norman R. F., Hoffman, L. Richard, and Read, William H. "Superior-Subordinate Communication: The Relative Effectiveness of Managers Who Held Their Subordinates' Positions." *Personnel Psychology*, 16:1-11 (1963).

54 Mancall, Mark. "Succession and Myth in Taiwan." *Journal of International Affairs*, 1:12-20, (1964).

55 Merei, Ferenc. "Group Leadership and Institutionalization." *Readings in Social Psychology*. Edited by Eleanor E. Maccoby, *et al*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958.

56 Mills, Theodore. *Group Structure and the Newcomer: An Experimental Study of Group Expansion*. Olso: Olso University Press, 1955.

57 Moffitt, Frederick J. "Why Superintendents Get Fired." *Nations Schools*, 75:54+ (May, 1965).

58 Newcomer, Mabel. *The Big Business Executive: The Factors that Made Him, 1900-1950*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955.

The predecessor is not consulted by the board regarding the selection of his successor.
The predecessor's recommendation for a successor is sought and approved.
The predecessor selects his successor years in advance and trains him for the job.
The predecessor selects his successor.
The predecessor may consult with other officials on the succession problem.
The predecessor feels that his recommendation will be accepted.

59 O'Donovan, T. R. and Deegan, A. X. "Some Career Determinants of Church Executives." *Sociology and Social Research*, 48:56-66 (Oct., 1963).

60 Ohlin, Lloyd, *et al*. "Crisis, Succession and Organizational Change." Unpublished paper.

The inside successor will maintain the status quo.

61 Powers, T. E. *Administrative Behavior and Factors Related to Upward Mobility*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1966.

62 Pruitt, Robert E. "Who is Expendable?" *American School Board Journal*, 145:14 (November, 1962).

63 Ramzy, Ishak, *et al*. "Notes on Initiation and Hazing Practices." *Psychiatry*, 25:354-362 (November, 1962).

The outsider will have a difficult time being accepted.
The outsider will come under attack.
The outsider fails to meet the expectations of the group.
The group places high and unrealistic expectations on the outsider.

The outsider is at first over-accepted and over-idealized.

64 Reynolds, James A. Innovations Related to Administrative Tenure, Succession, and Orientation: A Study of the Adoption of New Practices by School Systems. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Washington University, 1965.

65 Rice, Arthur H. "What Schoolmen Face: More Status, Less Security." Nations Schools, 73:16 (February, 1964).

The predecessor will be dismissed by the new board or not rehired.
The new board sees the predecessor as a favorite of the old board.

66 Rush, Myron. "Succession and Institutions in the Soviet Union." Journal of International Affairs, 1:67-75 (1964).

67 Rush, Myron. "The Khruschev Succession Problem." World Politics, 14:259-282 (January, 1962).

The predecessor is dictatorially inclined.
The predecessor establishes a triad to protect his appointed successor.
The predecessor appoints a triad of himself, his appointed successor, and a rival.
The predecessor may concentrate substantial power in only one rival.
The predecessor sets the stage for his appointed successor's assumption of power but does not consummate it.
The predecessor chooses a successor who will not threaten his present power or his future glory.
The predecessor may find it hard to prevent the seizure of the rest of his power.

68 Rustow, Danwart A. "Succession in the Twentieth Century." Journal of International Affairs, 1: 104-113 (1964).

69 Schafer, Eldon G. A Change of Power Structure Reflected on Board Composition and Superintendent Selection. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, Claremont, California, 1966.

70 Seeley, F. E. Consideration in Administrator Contract Termination. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1964.

71 Smith, M. B. "The Combat Replacement." The American Soldier. Edited by S. Stouffer, *et al*. New York: Princeton University Press, 1949.

72 Spinning, James M. "Whose Man Is the Superintendent?" Nations Schools, 62:26-27 (August, 1958).

73 Stewart, R. "Management Succession." The Manager, 23:279-582, 676-679 (1955).

74 Swearer, Howard R. and Rush, Myron. The Politics of Succession in the U.S.S.R., Little, 1964.

75 Taushy, C. and Dubin, R. "Career Anchorage: Managerial Mobility Motivations." American Sociological Review, 30:725-735 (Oct., 1965).

76 Totman, C. "Political Succession in the Takugawas Bakufu: Abe Masahiro's Rise to Power, 1843-1845." Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 26:102-124 (1966).

77 Trollope, Anthony. "A Succession Crisis and Its Resolution." Sociology through Literature: An Introductory Reader. Edited by L. A. Coser. Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1963.

78 Trow, Donald B. "Executive Succession in Small Companies." Administrative Science Quarterly, 6:228-239 (September, 1961).

79 Trow, Donald B. "Membership Succession and Team Performance." Human Relations, 13:259-269 (1960).

The inside successor initiates a chain of promotions with little effect on the organization.

80 Walden, John. School Board Changes and Involuntary Superintendent Turnover. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, Claremont, California, 1966.

81 Whyte, W. F. "Managerial Succession." Men at Work. Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1961.

The reaction of the subordinates to the successor will depend on the relations established by the predecessor.

82 Whyte, W. F. "Problems of Changing Supervisors." *Human Relations in the Restaurant Industry. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948.*

The predecessor was generally unpopular or was popular with a clique.
The predecessor was getting good cooperation from the staff.
The successor wins support by fitting into the predecessor's pattern of human relations.

83 Zald, Mayer N. and Ash, Roberta. "Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change." *Social Forces*, 44:327-340 (March, 1966).

The predecessor's death may lead to factionalism.

84 Zald, Mayer N. "Who Shall Rule? A Political Analysis of Succession in a Large Welfare Organization." *Pacific Sociological Review*, 8:52-60 (May, 1965).

The predecessor is without power to shape the choice of his own successor.
The predecessor lacks control of relevant information and the mechanism of election.
The predecessor is to influence the decision of the board on the choice of his successor.
Influencing the choice of the board must be done largely through indirect and informal means.

85 Ziller, Robert C. *et al*. "The Newcomer in Open and Closed Groups." *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 45:55-58 (February, 1961).

86 Ziller, Robert C. *et al*. "Assimilation of the Knowledgeable Newcomer under Conditions of Group Success and Failure." *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 60:228-291 (March, 1960).

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Angell, Richard B., Reasoning and Logic. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964.

Barker, Stephen F., The Elements of Logic. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965.

Braithwaite, Richard B., Scientific Explanation. New York: Basic Books, 1959.

Eaton, Ralph M., General Logic. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931.

Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. N. K. Smith, New York: MacMillan and Co., 1929.

Kuhn, Thomas S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.

Langer, Susanne K., An Introduction to Symbolic Logic. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1967.

Parsons, Talcott, Theories of Societies. eds. T. Parsons, et al. 3 vols., New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961.

Perelman, Ch., An Historical Introduction to Philosophical Thinking. New York: Random House, 1965.

Popper, K. R., The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959.

Stoll, Robert R., Sets, Logic and Axiomatic Theories. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1961.

Thiemann, Francis C., "Selected Bibliography on Succession in Complex Organizations." ERIC, University of Oregon, 1967.

Whitehead, Alfred North, and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950.

Zetterberg, Hans L., On Theory and Verification in Sociology. New Jersey: The Bedminster Press, 1965.